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Journal of International Criminal Justice Advance Access originally published online on August 29, 2007
Journal of International Criminal Justice 2007 5(4):953-975; doi:10.1093/jicj/mqm059
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© Oxford University Press, 2007, All rights reserved. For permissions please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute

Gerhard Werle*

* Professor of German and International Criminal Law, Criminal Procedural Law and Modern Legal History, Humboldt University, Berlin. [ gerhard.werle{at}rewi.hu-berlin.de]


  Abstract

The collective nature of crimes under international law does not absolve us of the need to determine individual responsibility. Article 25 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) now contains a detailed regulation of individual criminal responsibility. While discussing the elements of various modes of individual criminal responsibility, this essay shows that the most important difference between prior legal frameworks and Article 25(3) ICC Statute lies not in the redefinition of the scope of individual responsibility in international criminal law, but in the systematization of modes of participation. The case is made that Article 25(3) is best construed as a differentiation model with four levels of participation. In this model, modes of participation should be understood as indicative of the degree of individual guilt, and thus as helpful guidelines in sentencing matters. With particular reference to joint commission, the author shows that this concept also leads to a coherent interpretation of the various modes of participation.


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