Journal of International Criminal Justice Advance Access originally published online on April 19, 2007
Journal of International Criminal Justice 2007 5(2):272-286; doi:10.1093/jicj/mqm014
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Editorial Comments |
Was the Dujail Trial Fair?
* Miranda Sissons is Deputy Director, Middle East for the International Center for Transitional Justice. Ms. Sissons has monitored Tribunal developments and trial sessions over five Baghdad missions from 2004 to 2007 and has met extensively with Iraqi and international Tribunal participants. Ari Bassin is a Consultant, Prosecutions Division for the International Center for Transitional Justice. The authors thank Marieke Wierda and Abd al-Razzaq al-Saeidi for their invaluable assistance. [ msissons{at}ictj.org, aribassin{at}yahoo.com].
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Abstract |
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The Dujail trial against eight persons accused of crimes against humanity was intended as the first of fourteen trials; it was seen as a quick and simple case that would enable the Tribunal to develop its skills outside the limelight. The trial was in fact a missed opportunity in the search for Iraqi justice. It fell short in three notable ways: (i) it was severely compromised by political interference: lack of judicial independence, linked to the absence of a culture of respect for the fairness and impartiality of the judicial process, was the greatest failing of the trial; (ii) there were breaches in fair trial standards at the trial and appellate level; (iii) due to evidentiary and analytical gaps, the trial did not expose the full extent of crimes committed by the deposed regime; much of the judgment hinged on inference and stretched notions of liability. The Dujail trial was better than previous (and current) Iraqi trials. But that was not enough to meet minimum fair trial guarantees.