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Journal of International Criminal Justice Advance Access originally published online on December 15, 2006
Journal of International Criminal Justice 2006 4(5):959-981; doi:10.1093/jicj/mql076
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© Oxford University Press, 2006, All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

I. Responding to Terrorism: The Quest for a Legal Definition

Terrorism and War

Marco Sassòli*

* Marco Sassòli is Professor of International Law at the University of Geneva, Switzerland and Associate Professor at the Université du Québec à Montréal, Canada. He thanks his research assistants, Mr Éric Corthay and Ms Lindsey Cameron for their invaluable research in preparing this article and for revising the text. [ Marco.Sassoli{at}droit.unige.ch]


  Abstract

This article discusses when terrorism can be classified as war (i.e. a use of force) under both ius ad bellum and ius in bello. It looks at how terrorist acts committed in a genuine armed conflict are prohibited and how those committing them must be treated under international humanitarian law (IHL). The article then analyses the relationship between armed conflicts, the laws of war and anti-terrorism instruments. It is argued that if behaviour in armed conflicts is included in the latter, only acts prohibited by IHL should be classified as terrorist, in particular if state behaviour is excluded from the definition of terrorism. Thus contradictions between IHL and international anti-terrorism law can be avoided. Finally, it is suggested that, de lege ferenda, it might be useful to define terrorist acts in peacetime by analogy to what is prohibited in wartime.


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