Skip Navigation


Journal of International Criminal Justice Advance Access originally published online on January 16, 2006
Journal of International Criminal Justice 2006 4(1):64-77; doi:10.1093/jicj/mqk003
This Article
Right arrow Full Text
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow All Versions of this Article:
4/1/64    most recent
mqk003v1
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Jørgensen, N. H.B.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

© Oxford University Press,2006, All rights reserved. For permissions please email journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

The Problem of Self-Representation at International Criminal Tribunals

Striking a Balance between Fairness and Effectiveness

Nina H.B. Jørgensen*

* LLB (Bristol), D.Phil. (Oxon), Barrister; Senior Legal Adviser, Office of the Prosecutor, Special Court for Sierra Leone. The views expressed herein are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Special Court for Sierra Leone or any other organization. This article is an expanded version of a Note in 99 American Journal of International Law (2005) 663-668 and builds on a piece in 98 American Journal of International Law (2004) 711–726.

[jorgensenn{at}un.org]

The principle that the right to self-representation is not absolute, as established by international criminal tribunals, raises difficult questions of application that are still being worked out in the jurisprudence. There has been a recent shift in focus, from establishing the modalities for the exercise of the right in the early stages of the Milosevic trial to establishing the circumstances in which the right may be qualified. This article examines recent developments and considers where the threshold for revoking or qualifying the right to self-representation lies, how the various modes of court imposed representation may be synthesized and what the standard is for counsel who is representing an uncooperative accused.


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?




Disclaimer:
Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.